Fernández-Olmos, Rosell-Martínez, and Espitia-Escuer (2009) find that Spanish wineries' choices to make rather than buy most grapes are positively related to wine quality (i.e., wine differentiation of reserva and crianza wines from guarantee of origin wines),growers' investment in dedicated and specialized assets,and the level of behavioral and environmental uncertainty involved. The authors suggest that a lack of statistical significance for wineries' specialized investments reflects that their revenues are increasingly not just from winemaking but alsofrom wine tourism.Vertical integration is negatively related to size, as proxied by average capacity from 2002 to 2004, perhaps due to a need to source large amounts of grapes.
The authors conclude calling for more comprehensive research across the full spectrum of modes of exchange.
Wineries, like other businesses, seek to grow sales via product differentiation, which leads to heterogeneity of input needs across wineries. Such businesses may then implement their own grading standards and corresponding quality premiums to source inputs with quality attributes that support their differentiation strategy (Jang and Sykuta, 2008; Jang and Olson, 2010) or alternatively may produce inputs in-house. External suppliers may require having these terms in writing to serve specific winery needs. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1
Buyer measurement of quality is positively associated with sophistication of procurement mechanism.
H2
Quality premiums are positively associated with use of formal contracts.
Financial incentives may adequately ensure performance on objectively measurable or quantifiable attributes, like sugar (i.e., degree brix) or acidity, but other quality attributes, such as appearance or color and taste or flavor may be more subjective (Table 1) . According to the organizational economics literature (Mahoney 1992) , if quality is imperfectly measurable, or measurable only at high cost, then contract provisions can stipulate best practices known to exact/deliver quality, presuming their use is easily verified (i.e., the task is highly programmable). If both, quality is difficult to measure and production practices do not correlate with quality orare not easily verified, in-house production may be necessary. We hypothesize:
H3
Measurement difficulty is positively associated with usage of formal contracts.
Thus, specification or provision of specific production inputs may assist in ensuring quality. Gergaud and Ginsburgh (2007) show that technological choices (i.e., grape varieties, picking and fermenting technologies) affect quality much more than natural endowments (i.e., land characteristics and exposures of vineyards). Hence, we expect:
H4
Buyer specification or provision of inputs for growing and harvesting grapes is positively associated with sophistication of exchange mechanism.
Input specification or provision may ensure quality, but also may entail investment in specialized or durable assets by either, the supplier, the buyer, or both. In particular, specification of production inputs requires such investments on the part of the supplier, whereas provision of inputs implies investments on the part of the buyer. Reuer and Arino (2007) found that the complexity (i.e., number of provisions) of alliance contracts across several industries in Spain is significantly greater in the presence of such investments and significantly lower when prior ties exist among contracting parties. The costs of writing more complex contracts that cover dispute resolution procedures and consequences of breach and termination become worthwhile to protect the potentially appropriable quasi-rents stemming from these investments. In contrast, prior experience working together engenders trust and development of inter-organizational routines and a better understanding of each other's needs, procedures, management systems, cultures, etc. Looking more closely at the type of provisions included in contracts, Reuer and Arino (2007) identify that asset specificity significantly increases the use of enforcement provisions designed to safeguard quasi-rents, while prior ties significantly decrease the need for basic coordination provisions but not enforcement provisions. Hence, we hypothesize:
H5
Buyer specification or provision of inputs for growing and harvesting grapes is positively associated contract complexity and enforcement provisions in particular.
H6
Duration of trade relationship in years is negatively associated with contract complexity and coordination provisions in particular.
These hypotheses are empirically tested as described in the research design section.
Research Design

Research Context
We analyze a data on the proportion of grapes produced in-house or procured via formal or informal contracts by 98 wine grape handlers. The data are from a 1999 survey of 385 handlers of fruit, vegetable, and nut commodities in California (Hueth, Ligon, and Dimitri 2007) . Data from a pilot study for the survey instrument are reported in Hueth and Ligon (1999) .
Responses to an open-ended question about the firms' activities reveal that at least 70% are involved with grape production and 43% make wine. Whereas previous studies have focused on exchange of grapes between grower and winery, the available data allow us to also examine subsequent downstream transactions (i.e., how survey respondents sell grapes or wine). Factor analysis (Bollen 1989; Hair, et al. 1995; Thompson 2004) Several explanatory variables are measured directly by survey items. Years is how long the respondent's company has been in business and approximates experience or tenure.
Measures
Duration is the years of experience with growers, on average. Sales% is the percentage of revenues coming from grape or wine sales, and represents the importance of this activity to the company. Tons Bought (of grapes) is a reflection of company size.
Measurement Difficulty is survey participants' responses on a Likert scale of one (poorly)
through five (perfectly) to the question, "How well does what you measure capture all relevant quality attributes (for grapes)?" Finally, several binary variables (equal to one if yes and zero if no) indicate region of operation, the types of buyers (retail, wholesale, institutional, direct, export, etc.) that the respondent supplies, whether grower compensation is conditional on quality (i.e., Premium), and who measures quality (i.e., respondent, government, or another third party).
Modeling Marketing Behavior
The proportion of a crop procured or marketed by a particular method, say formal written contracts, may be estimated using Tobit regressions. The log-likelihood for the Tobit model contains probabilities of nonuse of contracts from a Probit regression in the first term and a classical regression for positive amounts contracted in the second term:
(1)
where Ф(•) is the standard normal probability density function, x i and β α are vectors of independent variables and coefficients, σ is the standard deviation, and α i denotes the proportion contracted.
2 Following Katchova and Miranda (2004), α i is not constrained from above since a producer conceivably may contract more than the actual ex post production. Under the Tobit formulation, the independent variables and associated coefficients are constrained to be the same for the contract adoption and proportion contracted decisions. Cragg's (1971) less restrictive hurdle or two-step model does not require the variables and coefficients for both decisions to be the same. The log-likelihood is the sum of the log-likelihood of a Probit regression (the first two terms) and the log-likelihood of a truncated regression (the second two terms) and is given by
, wherez i andγ are vectors of independent variables and coefficients pertaining to contract adoption and, and as before, x i and β i are vectors of independent variables and coefficients pertaining to the proportion contracted. When z i = x i and γ = β α /σ, equations (1) and (2) 
Results
Grape Procurement Methods
Marginal effects of Tobit, probit, and truncated ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of grape procurement method use are presented in Table 2 . Recall that the hurdle model (i.e., probit followed by truncated OLS) corresponds to sequentially made adoption and proportional usage decisions, and unlike Tobit models, does not restrict any particular explanatory variable to have the same effect on both decisions (Katchova and Miranda, 2004) . Tobit regressions, however, are particularly appropriate for modeling indices representing the overall formality of portfolio of procurement and marketing arrangements employed (i.e., Grower Formality and Buyer Formality). Thus, except for regressions of these indices, we will place more confidence in and focus discussion on the hurdle model results. Regressions were run in STATA, which automatically dropped some binary dummy variables from binary probit regressions due to statistical issues identified by the program. Fortunately, most of the variables of interest remain intact in the regression results presented here.
Several of the results for grape procurement methods are consistent with previous research (Table 2) . Goodhue, et. al (2003) find that more experienced wine grape growers in California are significantly more likely to sell through formal contracts as opposed to informal contracts. Here, Years in business also significantly increases usage of more formal procurement methods (i.e., Tobit results), reflecting greater use of in-house production and less use of formal contracts. Specifically, ten additional years in business, on average,increases the probability of in-house production by 11% (i.e., probit results) and its proportionaluse by 8% (i.e., truncated OLS results), while decreasing the probability of using formal contracts by 2% and their proportion use by 3%. Although Years does not influence adoption of informal contracting methods, it does increase their proportional use among those handlers using this informal procurement method. Apparently, with time and experience, those that use informal contracts become comfortable relying more heavily on them. Interestingly, as sales of grapes and wine become an increasingly important component of the business (i.e., Sales%), proportional use of formal contracts decreases significantly, but a lack of significant effects in other regressions provides no indication of which procurement methods are used in its place.
Regional dummies indicate greater use of in-house production and less proportional use of formal contracts with growers in the Sacramento Valley (Table 2 ). In-house production and informal contracts are used proportionally less and formal contracts proportionally more with growers in the San Joaquin Valley. With relatively fewer wineries in the San Joaquin region than in other regions in California (Goodhue, et. al, 2003) , few alternative buyers pose a small numbers problem for growers as a motivation for formal contract use (Williamson, 1975) . That is, with fewer buyers of perishable grapes, a winery could potentially renege on an informal agreement with a grower or accept delivery only at a lower price than previously agreed upon.
Relative to the baseline of an institutional buyer (i.e., food service or restaurants), having a retail buyer (i.e., supermarket or grocer) significantly increasesproportional use of formal contracts and decreases adoption of informal contracts ( Table 2) . None of the other binary dummy variables for buyer type are statistically significant. The result is somewhat surprising for the export buyer dummy, in particular, as evidence from the French wine industry (Crozet, Head, and Mayer, 2009 ) suggests a positive relationship between wine quality and exporting (i.e., producers of high quality wine export to more markets). If quality control requires tighter coordination, exporting wineries may be expected to utilize such practicesmore sothan those selling only domestically. Another binary dummy variable indicates that use of formal contracts with buyers makes grape handlers 21% more likely to use formal contracts and 43% less likely to use informal contracts with growers. This result may reflect use formal arrangements to coordinate exchange of higher quality products along the entire supply chain.
Relative to the baseline of quality measurement by government entities like the USDA, those grape handlers that that ascertain the quality of growers' grapes themselves are 54% more likely to also produce their own grapes and rely 84% more on their own production ( Table 2 ).
This finding directly supports hypothesis H1 (Buyer, i.e., grape handler, measurement of quality is positively associated with sophistication of procurement mechanism). Grape handlers that offer growers financial incentives for quality source about 13% more of their grapes using formal contracts than those not offering quality premiums, which is consistent with hypothesis H2 (Quality premiums are positively associated with use of formal contracts). The degree to which grape handlers' quality measurement procedures can capture all of relevant characteristics (i.e., measurement difficulty) is also significantly related to use of formal and informal contracts.
Specifically, greater measurement difficulty decreases the probability of using informal contracts by 28% and increases proportional use of formal contracts 13%, which supports hypothesis H3 (Measurement difficulty is positively associated with usage of formal contracts). When accurately measuring quality is difficult, stipulation of best practices may help to ensure quality (Mahoney 1992). Such terms may require specific investments by either of the parties to the exchange, prompting employment of formal contractual safeguards or vertical integration (i.e., ownership) of both stages of the supply chain to protect the value of these investments.
3 While grape handler specification or provision of Harvest Inputs (i.e., labor and equipment) is positively related to proportional use of informal contracts, specification or provision of Growth Inputs (i.e., fertilizer, pesticides, and plants) has a negative impact. Additionally, Growth Inputs significantly increases the probability of using formal contracts 7% and of using in-house grape production 18%. In the latter case, the statistic implies that those grape handlers who stipulate the use of certain growth inputs in contracts with growers are also more likely to produce at least some grapes themselves. 4 These findings are consistent with hypothesis H4 (Buyer specification or provision of inputs for growing and harvesting grapes is positively associated with sophistication of exchange mechanism).
Grape Procurement Contract Provisions
Grape handler provision or specification of Growth Inputs also significantly increases the complexity of contracts (i.e., number of contract provisions) and the types of provisions or contract terms included (Table 3) . 5 Such terms may require specific investments by either of the other parties to the contract, and hence may be expected to increase the number of contract provisions and the use of enforcement provisions like procedures for dispute resolution and terms of contract renewal, in particular. The low explanatory power (R 2 ) of regressions in Table   3 suggests opportunities for future research to better explain the variation in contract complexity and use of such provisions. Still, the results for Growth Inputs are generally consistent with Reuer and Arino's (2007) findings across several industries and lend some support to hypothesis H5 (Buyer specification or provision of inputs for growing and harvesting grapes is positively associated contract complexity and enforcement provisions in particular). One inconsistency is that specialized investments did not significantly influence use of coordination provisions in Reuer and Arino's (2007) study. Here, the positive relationship between Growth Inputs and provisions related to coordination of quality, likely reflect these investments in inputs are also intended to help ensure quality.
Reuer and Arino (2007) 
Grape and Wine Marketing Methods
Regression results explaining the methods used by grape handlers to market grapes or wine are presented in Table 4 . To our knowledge, prior research has not addressed this segment of the grape/wine supply chain. Again, except in the case of the index Buyer Formality, discussion is focused on the result of the more intuitive hurdle model (i.e., binary probit followed by truncated OLS). The most interesting results are related to buyer type, procurement method, and quality considerations. Specifically, grape handlers who sell to retail (e.g., supermarkets) or wholesale (e.g., brokers, processors, shippers) buyers use formal contracts for over 40% more of their sales.
Those that grow their own grapes or procure them via formal contracts, use informal contracts less and more formal mechanisms more when marketing. Quality appears to be relevant to organization across the entire supply chain, as the use of quality premiums with growers significantly increases the adoption of formal contracts by 20%, and correspondingly, causes a nearly statistically significant 22% decrease (p-value=0.107) in adoption of informal contracts.
Conclusions
This study investigates factors influencing use of alternative approaches to coordinating exchange within the California grape and wine supply chain. Prior research has examined Spanish wineries' decisions to make or buy grapes (Fernández-Olmos, Rosell-Martínez, and
Espitia-Escuer, 2009) and California grape growers' use of formal and informal contracts (Goodhue, Heien, Lee, and Sumner, 2003) . We offer a more comprehensive analysis of the supply chain from vineyards to wineries' customers. In particular, we are the first study, to our knowledge, to examine the use of formal and informal contracts between wineries and their customers.
At other stages of the supply chain, our results corroborate prior findings that quality considerations and needs to protect investments in specialized or durable assets significantly increase usage of more formal coordination mechanisms (i.e., formal contracts and vertical integration or ownership of successive stages of the supply chain). Consistent with findings for other industries (Reuer and Arino, 2007) , such investments are associated with greater contract complexity (i.e., number of contract provisions or terms) and inclusion of enforcement (i.e., dispute resolution and renewal) provisions, while trade partners' prior experience working together decreases contract complexity. Furthermore, our results suggest that quality considerations extend to greater use of formal contracts further downstream. As much of the variation in the contract provisions was unexplained by our models, there are opportunities to enhance our understanding of the factors influencing their use. Future research may examine if these findings hold in other grape and wine production regions, for instance, in Midwestern U.S.
regions of expanding winery tourism.
Endnotes
1 The relevance of quality for reputation and competitive advantage is well-documented for the wine industry in general (Landon and Smith, 1998; Dubois and Nauges, 2007; Ashenfelter, 2007; Castriota and Delmastro, 2009 ). 
